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In this paper a search and bargaining model of the emergence of localised
factor markets is presented. As the model draws heavily on the search
theoretic literature of the labour market it deals mainly with the conditions of
localised labour markets. In the concluding sections the applicability to other
factor markets will be discussed.
A general interest in the analysis of localised factor markets is derived
from the fact that in general equilibrium theory the assumption of a uniform
geographic distribution of resources implies that all economic activity boils
down to Robinson Crusoe economies. Under the assumptions of the Arrow-
Debreu model each economic agent would produce for his or her own
consumption (Scotchmer/Thisse 1992). All economic activities would be
uniformly distributed over geographic space. As long as there are not some
goods or resources that are immobile or untradeable in a physical sense each
pint in geographic space cold be the basis o an autarkic economy where
goods re produced on an arbitrarily small scale. To avoid this extreme result
the number of firms is assumed to be fixed in models of a production
economy or the analysis is restricted to exchange economies without firms.
Just to assume that there is a non-uniform distribution of principallyimmobile resources seems to be a weak basis of an explanation of
interregional specialisation and trade.
• In this paper we address the question whether there are economic
reasons for factor supplies being available only in certain locations although
they are mobile in principle, if there are such reasons substance could be
given to models of interregional (or international) specialisation and trade
which are based on a non-uniform distribution of resources by just assuming
that factors of production are immobile.
1
Besides in international trade theory which is based on the assumption
that there is a non-uniform distribution of resources there are growth
theoretic models which analyse the consequences of immobile resources on
the relative growth performance and the trade structures of individual
regions. For example in the model of Walz (1993) the existence of an
immobile factor of production which is considered as land or the subset of
the labour force that is immobile leads to the incomplete geographical
concentration of final goods production.
More specifically there are models studying the consequences of
^Marshallian factor market externalities" for the dynamics of industrial
The extreme assumption of perfect intersectoral factor mobility and complete
immobility between sectors is constituent for orthodox models of international
trade.3
localisation (David/Rosenbloom 1990). These factor market externalities are
defined as ,,pecuniary externalities that tend to reduce the prices at which
primary inputs can be purchased as more and more of those inputs come to
be assembled at the locale in question." The positive pecuniary externality
associated with increasing local labour market size is held to be due to the
an insurance or ,,risk pooling" effect of an increasing number of both
workers and employers. This claim is derived from the assumption that
random productivity or demand shocks are firm specific, i.e. it is assumed
that these shocks are not correlated whether the firms belong to the same
industry or not. In such a case the presence of a large number of employers
at a given location reduces the magnitude of the temporal variations in
aggregate labour demand expected at a specific location. The smaller
variance in earnings that workers would experience would make the larger
labour market more attractive to risk averse potential workers choosing their
residential location. The lower search costs per worker and the advantages
of the ,,risk pooling" resulting from a large number of firms with uncertain
but uncorrelated labour demand lead to a relatively low supply price of
labour. In the David and Rosenbloom article all this is taken as a premise
without providing a microeconomic explanation of its genesis. Thearguments presented above had been used to specify, a net immigration
function.
A partial. equilibrium analysis of the microeconomics of this model is
found in Krugman's (1991) model of ,,labour market pooling". In his model
uncertain labour demand, labour demand being uncorrelated across firms,
iftiakes workers migrate to locations with a higher number of firms. Once
workers have decided on the location they are unable to change the location
of labour supply reacting to short run variations of labour demand. Firms are
assumed to be unable to split up production and choose different locations
with a smaller scale of production . As a consequence firms will tend to
choose locations with a larger work force. It is the interaction of demand or
productivity uncertainty and increasing returns to scale which creates labour
market pooling and industry localisation.
The search-and-bargaining model that will be presented below captures
well what in the model of Rotemberg and Saioner (1990) is taken to be a
central precondition of interregional specialisation, namely the competition
of firms for the services of workers.
Close to the search and bargaining model of localised labour markets
developed here is the early search theoretic model of David (1973). The
search process of a risk neutral worker is described as taking a money-valued ball from an urn. Upon paying an ,,entry fee" the searcher learns the
particular probability distribution to which the dollar values therein conform.
After choosing an ,,urn" the worker has to decide on a specified number of
balls to be drown in sequence replacing each before extracting the next and
recording its value, the searcher will then be allowed to retrieve any one ball
contained in the random sample. For each picking of a ball ,,sampling
charges" have to be incurred, it is assumed that the ball with the highest
dollar value will be chosen. The sampling process is governed by the rule
that the sample should not be increased beyond the point at which the
marginal improvement in the expected maximum of future draws becomes
less than the incremental sampling cost. Simplifying the model it is assumed
that the urns do not differ by the mean dollar value of the balls contained but
by higher moments of the distribution which are indicated on the labels of
the urns. In addition, it is supposed that the entry fee is the same for all urns
and that the sampling cost schedules are uniform, tool As a result, the only
reason for selection among the urns consists of the inter-urn variations of the
expected extreme value due to differences in the dispersion and skewness
characterising the underlying population distributions. If these distributions
are symmetric the expected maximum value, gross or net of uniform
expenditures for entry and sampling, will be greatest for he urn where theunderlying population variance happens to bee greatest. Proceeding to a
model of migration ,,urns" are identified as local labour markets, ,,balls" are
to be considered as job offers. The ,,entry fee" which has to be incurred
before learning the sampling opportunities of a peculiar local labour market
represents the pecuniary and psychic cost of migration which is taken to be a
prerequisite to start searching on local labour market. Assuming that the
potential migrant is living in the dull uniformity of the countryside he or she
would find it attractive to emigrate to seek fortune in a location where the
relative variance of the prevailing distribution of job offers is
1-greatest.. Net-
migration would then happen to locations where levels of average real
earnings are not necessarily highest. One implication of David's model is
that workers might stay in larger localised factor markets even though there
are other locations with higher average wage rates
Much in the spirit of the model of David, Maier (1987) has tried to
exploit the job search literature with respect to the explanation of localised
labour markets. Emphasizing the general importance of search processes for
the explanation of migration and localised factor markets he comes up with
rather negative results on the usefulness of the search theoretic literature. His
findings rather suggest that information channnels are of overwhelmingimportance for deriving labour market pooling from assuming incomplete
information of workers.
Finally, there is the model on an agglomeration economy of Helsley and
Strange (1990) who extend the standard monocentric model of a residential
land market to include a labour market with heterogeneous workers and
firms as well as imperfect information. Agents deciding on their residential
location choose a city knowing the number but not the characteristics of the
other agents. Workers do not know job requirements of firms and firms do
not know the skills of the workers. The agglomerative force results from the
workers' and firms' expectations that better matches can be realised in
larger cities. It is shown that the expected quality of the matches increases
with city size. In equilibrium the agglomerative tendency is balanced by the
negative consequences for firms' profits of increased spatial competition.
The model we present here does not, by contrast, depend on the
restrictive assumption that productivity shocks are firm specific. It appears
to be more appropriate to suppose that output variations are region or
industry specific. The higher the level of regional specialisation the stronger
would be the coincidence between regional and sectoral output volatility.
The model of the search process that is used here does not require the
restrictive assumption that workers have to incur the costs of a residentialrelocation (the ,,entry fees" in the model of David) before they can start their
search process or, more specifically, before they can obtain information on
the distribution on job offers of a local labour market. That is, the results of
the paper do not depend on the existence of (high) costs of acquiring
information on the characteristics of local labour markets and are not driven
by the differences of the variance of job opportunities between different
local labour markets, given identical average wage prospects for different
localities.
Workers are assumed to be identical; there are no differences in skills.
Hence the agglomerative economies do not. arise from the expectation of
qualitatively improved matches depending upon the size of the local labour
market.
2 Model description
The basic assumption of the model is that information of workers regarding
the location of vacant jobs and their characteristics (compensation, non-
pecuniary characteristics, job security) is imperfect. Job-related information
has to be acquired and evaluated before a worker can or is willing to become
employed. As in most of the literature on job search, this process is
considered to be costly and sequential (cf. e.g. Mortensen 1986). Theworker's decision problem under these conditions involves a choice of a
strategy for ,,shopping" and the selection of a criterion that determines when
job opportunities are ,,acceptable". As the job search is modelled according
to the sequential ,,stopping approach" borrowed from statistical decision
theory (DeGroot 1970), the worker is regarded as sampling job offers one at
a time and deciding on the basis of the sample obtained to date whether or
not to stop the search process. As will be seen, the sample size is a random
variable whose distribution is i.a. determined by the stopping rule. In order
to take account of the fact that search requires time, search costs should be
interpreted as a flow per unit of search time, a net deduction from the value
of time, which could otherwise be spent on some other activity, plus the
financial costs associated with search. Time requirements of search depend
on job availability, i.e. the frequency with which job offers arise. Finally,
future costs and returns of search need to be discounted.
Before we discuss in detail what guides the search process we have to
develop how the characteristics of the job offer are determined. In particular
we are interested in how the wage offer comes about. In most of the
literature on job search it is assumed that wage offers are made as "take-it-
or-leave-it offers". We assume instead that the compensation for work is the
result of a bargaining agreement between the employer and the worker on10
how to divide the "value of a match" (Wolinsky 1995). The value of a match
is identical to the discounted present value of the (monetary) surplus that is
created by establishing an employment relationship, supposedly with an
infinite time horizon. This surplus is divided by a noncooperative bargaining
process (Rubinstein 1982, Binmore 1994); The substitution of the
assumption that only employers can make binding commitments is motivated
by the argument of Diamond (1971) saying that if only employers can
commit to wage offers and search costs are positive, the wage level should
be equal to the subsistence level. This would result from the fact that if a
worker accepted a wage offer greater or equal to the "value of not working"
the employer could decrease the wage by slightly less than the search cost
without running the risk of being deserted by the worker. If the workers
were identical with respect to their labour-leisure choice the distribution
function the worker draws from can only be degenerate. Moreover, to
assume that employers are able to make wage commitments implies that
they do not behave in a subgame perfect way. If employers stick to wage
offers when accepted by workers in the course of settling the details of a
labour contract they are not strictly profit maximising.
Assuming that there are many employers and many workers such that we
can exclude coalition formation on either side of the market, the bargaininggame is played by bilaterally between a potential employer and a potential
worker. The monetary value of the surplus bargained over is denoted by m.
All costs and benefits are counted in monetary terms. It is assumed that the
agents have access to credit markets in which they can insure against income
fluctuations at actuarially fair rates. This allows us to consider all agents as
risk-neutral. The stream of future net returns which can in principle be
interpreted as von Neumann-Morgenstern "utilities" can then be taken to be
streams of net incomes. The bargaining process takes place over discrete
time periods of length A and will be labelled by t, t=0,l,2.... In each period
one of the parties is selected randomly, with probability 0.5 and
independently of previous selections, to propose a division of the value of
the employment relationship. The other party responds immediately by
accepting the offer or rejecting it. If the offer is accepted, it is implemented
and the game ends.
Outside options
Workers and employers do not only search from unmatched positions,
like in the standard search theoretic literature, but look for alternative
bargaining opportunities as part of an ongoing bargaining game as well,
these alternative bargaining opportunities are called "outside options". When12 , .• • .
an outside option has been encountered the agent is able to immediately
identify its value and to decide whether to adopt it or not. Adoption of such
an opportunity ends the ongoing bargaining process and initiates another
one, i. e. each bargaining party can only engage in one project at a time.
Job availability and the uncertainties inherent in the job search process
are accounted for by introducing q(n,A) as the probability distribution over
the number of offers n received per period of length A. To reflect the
restriction that time is required to find a job and that bargaining
opportunities are found sequentially, the distribution is assumed to be
Poisson
q(n,D)=e~
lD{lDf ln\. (1)
with X denoting the arrival rate of bargaining opportunities. The inverse of
the offer arrival rate is the expected length of time between two arrivals of
bargaining opportunities.
With probability ^Awill party i of the bargaining game encounter an
outside opportunity. Let N; denote the number of workers in the market and
Nj the number of employers. That is Nj will be smaller than N;. The arrival
rate of the workers depends on the relative numbers of market participants in
the following way: XjA being the probability that an employer encounters aelfwirfrschafi
 1
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bargaining opportunity in period t, the total number of meetings is AS.ANj.
For the arrival rate of the workers we then obtain
In a stationary environment with an unchanged number of market
participants and an unchanged job availability the arrival rates well be
constant over time. (Net) search costs per time period are assumed to be
fixed and constant, b; is the value per time unit of using the time for an
alternative to working, kj is the individual search cost per unit of time. That
is, total net costs of search per period are equal to (bj-kj)A.
The monetary values of the outside options for party i are realisations of
identically and independently distributed random variables with a cumulative
distribution function Gj(0 which is continuously differentiable and has its
support on [0,Mj] where Mj>m.
Order of events
Suppose that the process has arrived at period t without the parties having
agreed to a division of the surplus or having adopted an outside option. At
the beginning of that period a chance move allocates the right to make a
proposal. The proposer then makes an offer to which the other party14 • •
responds with acceptance or rejection. The acceptance implies immediate
implementation of the proposal and the end of the game. Upon rejection the
bargaining parties move on to the search stage of period t. Doing so they
have to incur the search costs kA and then may encounter an alternative
bargaining opportunity. If the value of the outside option is larger than the
value of the match that is currently bargained over it will be adopted. If both
parties do not adopt their outside option they well proceed into the
bargaining stage of period t+1.
The bargaining process ends' at some stage t after each party has
obtained a certain sum x and has incurred a stream of search costs. The
agents are assumed to maximise expected utility. Party i's present value of a
stream of returns (xo, xi, ..., xt,...) is given by ]T8'(A)x, where 6J(A)denotes
agent i's discount factor in period t. Under the above assumptions on access
to the credit market the discount factors should be identical for all i.
Switching later to a continuous time representation we shall write
8(A) = e'
rA with r denoting the interest rate.
The distribution function Gj(-), the value of "leisure" b; and the search
costs kj are mutual knowledge of the players. A strategy of the search-and-
bargaining game comprises a sequence of decisions on which proposal to15
make (if she or he is randomly chosen as a proposer), a decision on which
proposal to accept (if the rival was chosen to make a proposal) and whether
or not to adopt an outside option (if such has been encountered after the
rejection of a proposal).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section the equilibrium of the search-and-bargaining game is
discussed. To begin with the bargaining game is ignored and the search
component is studied in isolation.
3.1 Optimal Search
After each draw from the distribution function Gj(-) the searcher has a
choice: She or he can keep what has been obtained or incur the net search
costs (bj-kj) and take another draw from the distribution function Gj(-). The
searcher obtains a profit which consists of the opportunity that is eventually
accepted minus the costs of the entire search history. It has been shown that
an optimal search rule exists under rather mild conditions (DeGroot 1970;
Kohn and Shavell 1974, Lippmann and McCall 1976, 1981 and McCall
1970). The profit depends on the actual draws the searcher gets from Gj(-)16
and on the decisions to accept or reject particular opportunities.
1 The
optimal rule must maximise the expected net return of the searcher. If v;"
denotes the expected value of a searcher following an optimal strategy, she
or he should never accept an opportunity that has a value less than V'. The
timing is assumed to be such that search costs have to be incurred
immediately. Benefits of the search activity accrue in the next period and
have to be discounted.
Let Wi(m,y) represent the given present value of stopping the search
process, accepting the best opportunity (m,y) encountered to date, m denotes
the joint return of the cooperation between the employer and the worker, the
gross product of employing one more worker, y the layoff rate, i. e. the
probability that the worker is laid off at the end of the period. The
acceptance of the offer implies that the worker will work for one period for a
wage w(m) which is a function of m as the wage is the result of a search and
bargaining process which will be explained below. W; is assumed to be a
continuous, strictly increasing function m with Wj(0,y) = 0.
It is assumed that the searcher can make only one observation at a time. For models
allowing for several simultaneous observations cf. Morgan (1983,1986) and Morgan
and Manning (1985).17
The,value of the optimal search strategy v"is conditional on the
searchers information set Q. Maximising wealth, the worker continues
search, given a best available job offer (m,y) to date if and only if
Vj (Q)> Wj(x,y), with x denoting the random best offer realised. Since the
analogous acceptance rule applies for the next period, we have as a general
expression for the value of search
(}]} (3)
In expression (3) x is the random best offer realised during the next period of
length A and Q(t+A) is the information set which the worker will have in the
next period, the first term on the right hand side indicates the net costs of
search. The second term represents the expected present value of tomorrow's
optimal stopping decision which is made once the next period's best offer
and information is known, conditional on the information available today.
Here it is assumed that the future sequence of draws is identically and
independently distributed and that the distribution is known for all periods.
In other words, the information set remains constant over all t and the agent
learns nothing. As a result, the value of continued search is a constant18
through time. Summarising, we have the following expression for the value
of search:
M,
X q(n, A) J max[VJ, W, (x, Y)}iG, (A-, y; n) + q(0. A )l*
0
,or
Xq{n, A) Jmax[O, Wt(x,y)- V,}dGi(x.y-n)
.
 ! o
(4)
The equation has a unique solution for the value of search V,, provided that
the mean of the distribution function Gj is finite (Kohn and Shavell 1974).
The worker's optimal search strategy satisfies the reservation property, and
the reservation value m*, is the unique solution to W(m*,y) = V. The
reservation property says that the worker's wealth maximising search
strategy has the property that it is optimal to accept an opportunity when the
highest valued opportunity in any period is equal to or in excess of a critical
number called the reservation value m*. The value of accepting a job, and
more specifically, whether the layoff rate as any influence on the reservation
value depends crucially on assumptions about market participation
immediately after the ending of an employment relationship (Wright 1987).
We start by assuming that workers cannot sample a new offer in the same
period in which a separation between the employer and the worker has19
occurred. In this case the layoff rate does not influence the reservation wage
(Burdett and Mortensen 1980, Hey and Mavromaras 1981, Ioannides 1981).
For the analytical purpose of this paper it is at the same time the most
interesting case as the results on the emergence of localised labour markets
do not depend on the layoff rate having an influence on the reservation
wage. If the worker has to wait for the next period to search for another
employment we have as the value of accepting a job offer
Wi (m, y) = w(m)A + 5(A)Y[(>, - k, )A + 8(A)V;* 1
(5)
.(m,y),(b{ -k(f ]
Accepting a job means that in the immediately following period the worker
receives the wage offered w which is the result of bargaining over a specific
m. In the subsequent period he or she will loose the job with probability y,
dispose of the value of the alternative to working and have the discounted
expected benefit of search in the third period. In case that there is no
employer-initiated separation in the second period the worker can either stay
on in the employment relationship or quit and search in the third period. If
the last option were optimal, i.e. Wj(m,y) < (bi-kj)+5(A)Vi\ it would never
have been optimal to have accepted the job in the first place. That is, (5)
implies that20
;(m, y) = w(m)A + Y8(A)(>, - A- )A + y[5 (A)]
2 V- + (l - Y)S(A)V^ (m, Y), or
, ~ *,> + Y[5(A)]
2 if
''
m>TJ" ; l-0-Y)5(A)
(6)
A sufficient condition for an offer to be acceptable is that
For a given layoff rate the reservation value m* follows from the equation
(7)
Any job offer (m,y) for which m > m* is acceptable then. Using (7) it
follows from (6) that
w(m*)A = (l-8(A))(^-Jk,-)A + (l-5(A))8(A)V;* (8)
Equation (8) shows that the wage implied by the reservation value m* is
independent of the layoff rate. Given a wage offer that equals exactly the
reservation wage, the agent will be indifferent between accepting and
working or rejecting and remaining unemployed. Therefore the probability of
a future layoff is of no consequence, as long as a future layoff leaves the
worker in the same state with respect to his search opportunities he would
be in had he rejected the offer in the first place.21
Given the definition of a best job offer above and the Poisson, offer arrival
rate specification in (2), equation (4) simplif.es considerably in the
continuous time version which corresponds to the limiting case of an
infinitesimal period length. Specifically, the assumption of the Poisson
process implies that the probability of a single offer arrival per period of
length A is approximately equal to A,A while the probability of more than one
arrival is approximately zero when the period is small. Formally, we replace
equation (4). by
Vi = fa - *,> + e~
rA\ [1 - *.f.A + X,-AF(x,y)ty + A, A J Wi(y)dF(y,y)i, (9)
with e"
r
A denoting the discounting operator. A.A[1-F(x,y)] is the probability
that a searcher will accept an offer in an interval A as it is the probability
that the researcher will encounter an opportunity times the probability that
this opportunity will be from the upper tail of the distribution F. With the
complementary probability the searcher will reject the offer and start
searching again. Approximating e"
r
A by (1-rA) and discarding all terms
involving A
2, we obtain after simplifiction: .22
Xi\
MlWi(y)dF(y,Xl)+bl-ki
Excluding again that it might be optimal to remain unemployed forever we
have the equivalent expression
rV* =(b--ki) + Xi \\Wi(x,y)-V*\iF(x,y). (11)
o
As V represents the searcher's "wealth" when searching, rV is an "imputed
income" derived from that wealth per time period. Equation (11) indicates
that this imputed income is equal to the value of time not spent working net
of search costs plus the expected capital gain attributable to search. This
expected capital gain, in turn, is equal to the expected difference between
the net present value of accepting a job and the wealth imputed to search.
Searching optimally, the reservation value m* is implicitely determined from
equating the value of search and the value of accepting a job.
V*(m*,y)=~Wi(m*,y).. (
12)
Proceeding from equation (6) and letting A recede to zero we obtain for the
reservation wage of the searching worker:
w(m*)=rV* --^-\b-k + V*] (13)23
with the worker's value of searching optimally being denoted by V*. Let V*
be the employer's value of searching optimally. If the sum of the worker's
and the employer's valuation exceed the surplus m that is obtained from
initiating an employment relationship (V^ + V2 > m) the parties will not
attempt to reach an agreement and will just keep on searching optimally.
Clearly, no party will accept a match that results in less than the value of
search V", i = 1,2. If Vj + V7 > m there is no solution that gives both sides
more than V,".
If Vj + V2 < m there exists a perfect equilibrium in which the parties
reach an agreement.The equilibrium is charcterised by values for the
bargining payoffs Wj and reservation values of the search process x* (i =
1,2) such that Vj <m-W2 and V2 <m — W]. As the bargaining surplus and
the bargaining payoffs must be non-negative we can write in compact
notation:
Vj* < m - W2 < Wl < m - V2* (14)
If the length of a single period A is sufficiently small, the perfect equilibrium
is unique.24
Taking account of the fact that the distribution function F(m,Y) is known
and defining Q(m) as the distribution function [1-F(m,y)] for given values of
the layoff rate, the equilibrium values are obtained from the following four
equations:
m—Wk =\1 — KJQ(XJ jAjil —XkQ(xl)Ap(A)--\Wi +m—Wk\
-Xi\Wl(x)dQ(x)+bi-ki
= 1,2(15)
V; (16)
Equations (15) are the basic equations of the bargaining solution. Equations
(16) are the first order conditions for an optimal reservation value derived
from equations (15). The right hand side of (15) shows the expected payoff
to party i in the subgame that starts immediately after a proposal was
rejected. The first term on the r.h.s. indicates the expected value of both
parties not finding a better match and agreeing to an equal split of the
bargaining surplus.
1 The second term gives the (negative) sum of the
expected value of finding a better match after having incurred the net costs
On the division of the surplus of a noncooperative bargaining game cf. Shaked and
Sutton (1984). On the equivalence of the result with the cooperative Nash
bargaining solution cf. Binmore et al. (1986).25
of search. The third term is equal to the discounted expected value of party k
of finding a better match and deserting party i, forcing the latter to search
again optimally from an unmatched position. Equations (16) establish that,
given Wj and Wk the choice of the x'maximise.the expected payoff.' A direct
application of Brouwer's fixed point theorem ensures that if V' + V'k < m, the
system (15) - (16) has a solution satisfying condition (14) (cf. Appendix of
Wolinsky (1987)). If the length of the bargaining period is sufficiently small
it can be shown that the perfect search and bargaining equilibrium is unique.
3.2 Solution based on strategic bargaining
The size of the Wj depends on the length of the bargining period A. A is
assumed to be small, or, more specifically, we let A recede to zero and view
the limiting equilibrium outcome as the solution of the bargining game.
Solving equations (15) and (16) and taking the limits we get
2
(r + XiQ(m))Vr(m)+ XkQ(m)V; - (r + \kQ(m))V**(m)- Xj
(17)
The intuition behind equations (15) on the worker's side derives from the above
result that the reservation wage must be equal to the imputed income on the value of
accepting a job. The value of accepting a job corresponds to the worker's bargaining
payoff.26
This equation can be transformed to the easily interpretable expression
W: = m- Wk =-(m + d: -dk) = d-. +-(m-di-dk). (18) • A. ^ \ ' ft / » rt \ ' A, /
In equation (18) the payoff of the search-and-bargaining game is expressed
as the sum of the conflict payoff of player i and the equal split of the
difference between the bargaining surplus and the conflict payoffs of the
individual players, denoted by dj and dk. These conflict payoffs can be
expressed as a weighted average of the values of search in an unmatched
position Vj and in an ongoing bargaining relationship V" (j = i,k). The value
of search in an unmatched position is determined according to equations (8)
or (10), respectively. The value of search in an ongoing bargaining process
differs from that value in that the reservation value for the "gross joint
payoff" of forming the employment relationship m must be at least as high as
the reservation value of search from the unmatched position. Otherwise the
wage bargaining wouldn't have been initiated. From equation (17) we have
the following disagreement payoffs:
d _(r + \iQ(m))vr(m) + XkQ(m)V-
( Xfi()XG())27
k {r + -ktQ{m) + \kQ{m)) ^
From these equations we get the weighted averages
dj = oLjVj* +(\-o.j)vj withj = i,k (21)
and
r + X:Q(m)
aj
 = i „, \ , n, ,
 wit
h J *
 l = i'
k- (22)
The weights denote the relative probabilities of not continuing the bargaining
relationship and searching from a matched or an unmatched position,
respectively.
Given that the bargaining surplus is divided according to the Binmore
Rubinstein bargining model which under the conditions of the model
presented here coincides with the cooperative Nash bargaining solution,
existence of a schedule [W](m), W2(m)] which satisfies (16) follows for the
steady state of the labour market from a contraction map theorem of
Blackwell (1965) (cf. also chapter 5 of Bertsekas 1987). The steady state of
the labour market is defined by all unmatched agents having a constant
arrival rate, all agents choosing ththe reservation value of their search
policies optimally and thesteady state numbers of workkers and employers28
being consistent with the initial conditions, i. e. N} - N2 = Af,- - N2, with
N" denoting the initial number of workers and N" denoting the initial
number of employers. Given this model of wage determination we are able
to show how localised factor markets may arise and what determines their
size.
4 Geograpical Dimension of Localised Labour Market
So far we have only looked at one point market. It is we shown that the
existence of a positive probability that the worker may loose the job alone
may lead to a labour market pooling under the conditions set out in section
3. In contrast to the models of David (1973) and Maier (1987) we assume
that search does not require the job searcher to migrate to a prospective job
location before being able to search there. Rather we ignore that
communication costs which are associatied with job search and depend on
the residential location of the job searcher relative to the prospective job
location.
1 Even if search costs are related to this distance a major part of
For the same reason a direct application of the search theoretic models of spatial
competition (e.g. Wolinsky (1983) and Kopp (1994)) to the job search context
appears to be inadequate. In the models of spatial competition, due to the
assumption of "mill pricing", the price searching consumers have to visit suppliers of
the consumer good and incur the transportation costs. Here it is assumed that the
search process does not require transportation, or rather that the associated costs
are negligible compared to the (prospective) returns.29
them is normally borne by the prospective employer. Moreover, this
assumption takes account of the decreased and decreasing communication
costs. However, the distance between the residential location of the job
searcher and the job locations is such that it is impossible to commute
between the residential location and the work place. That is, the acceptance
of a job necessitates a residential relocation. We consider these costs to be
substantial. To begin with, they are treated as fixed, i. e. the distance
dependend transportation costs are assumed to be small compared to
transaction costs on the housing market and other costs of adapting to a new
location
To keep things simple and without any loss of generality we assume that
there are two locations which are identical with the exception of different
numbers of employers and workers. We distinguish the locations as location
one, with only one employer and location n with N employers. It is assumed
that employers do not react to the migration decisions of the workers. That
is, the number of employers in each location is taken to be exogenously
given.
We now consider a jobless worker residing in a third location deciding to
migrate location one or two. As migration costs are assumed to be fixed the
distance between the current residential location of the potential migrant and30
the location of the job is of no importance for the migration decision. As we
assumed tht search costs are independent of distance-related costs of
communication, search after being laid off does not refer only the the
potential employers of one location but to all remaining N employers in both
locations.
1 This avoids the result of the above cited migration models that
job search is always related to just one location with the consequence of a
strong spatial labour market segmentation.
The decision where to migrate depends on where the worker encounters
a higher value of accepting a job, as formalized in equation (6) above. To
see how the migration costs influence this decision we abstract for a moment
form the facht that in equilibrium wages will differ between the two
locations. Searching optimally, the value of accepting a job offer w(m)
(>w(m*)) in location two with only one employer is:
V^
(2
) =;W(m)A + 8y[(6, - k{)A + 5(Vj* + /?)] + 5(1 -y)W,
(2
) (23)
With probability y the worker will be laid off after a period of length A. Any
other job she or he might find will be in location one. A layoff is therefore
always associated with the costs of relocation R. The present value of the
We do not consider temporary layoffs, i. e. that the worker is reemployed
immediately after an employer-initiated separation.3!
cost of migration is 8yR. If the job in location two continues (with
probability (1-y)) the migration costs occur with probability y in the
subsequent period etc.
If the worker accepts a job in location one, in which we have the same
layoff probability, we obtain the following algrbraic expression for the value
of accepting a job:
W{
('' = w(m) + by[(b{ - it, )A + d(v* - F(m *)
/v~
1 [l - F(m )]/?)] + 8(1 - y)Wj
('
)
(24)
A worker who accepts a job in location one will also be laid off at the end of
a working period with length A with probability y. There are, however, N-l
employers left with whom she or he may initiate an employment relationship
without having to change the residential location. Only if she or he is
disappointed with all the N-1 job offers and agrees to the offer in location
two he has reason to move and bear the migration costs. As both
probabilities are smaller than one the value of accepting a job in location one
will clearly be higher than accepting a job offer in location two with a lower
number of, here only one, potential employers. The attractiveness of the
agglomeration will be the higher the greater is the difference between the
number of employers in the two locations. The fact of the possibility of32
being laid off alone, without any location specific differences in the layoff
rates and without any dependence of the search behaviour from the layoff
rate in the sense that the latter doesn't influence the choice of the reservation
value, the labour market uncertainty with respect to job security induces a
further concentration of jobs in one location.
This effect, is: reinforced by the fact that the prospect of (a higher
probability of) having to migrate after being laid off in the smaller location
will reduce the reservation value of the workforce there. As the
disagreement payoffs of the employers are insensitive to the geographic
structure, this implies a relatively stronger bargaining position of firms in the
smaller location.
5 Conclusions
It has been shown that job insecurity can lead to a Marshallian "labour
market pooling". The model proceeds from the assumption that workers
searching for a job are confronted with job offers that are characterised by a33
wage offer and a positive probability of being laid off after a certain
employment period. The searchers don't know ex ante which type of
employer they meet but know the multivariate distribution of job
productivities and layoff rates. Search acts are independent draws from this
distribution function. Search is conducted subject to an optimal stopping rule
that takes account of the job insecurity. The benefit of initiating an
employment relationship is divided between the employer and the worker in
a bargaining process. At each stage of the bargaining process that is
characterised by disagreement the bargaining parties have the opportunity to
search outside partners.
It is shown that even without any dependence of the reservation value
determining the search behaviour on the layoff rate and without any
dependence of search costs on the geographic structure of the job search
there is a strong tendency for labour market pooling, that is a high
attractiveness of locations with relatively high number of employers. This
tendency might reinforced by the location decisions of firms who find it
advantageous to locate near large (specialised) labour markets.34
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